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Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Illusory
Safeguards against Funding Pervasively
Sectarian Institutions of Higher Learning
MARK STRASSERt
INTRODUCTION
When the issue of public funding of private schools is
discussed, the focus is often on whether-or to what
extent-the state is permitted to provide vouchers so that
children can attend private elementary or secondary
schools. What is too often underappreciated is that there is
a separate, more forgiving jurisprudence in the context of
aid to higher education, which seems to contradict many of the
explications of establishment clause jurisprudence that have
been offered by the Court. That the jurisprudence is hard to
reconcile has two distinct effects-it makes establishment
clause jurisprudence within this area impossible to understand
so that there is no coherent guidance for courts confronted
with a challenge to the provision of aid in the higher
education context, and the Court's analysis in this area
bleeds over into other areas, making establishment clause
analysis as a general matter even more difficult.
Part I of this Article discusses the trilogy of cases in
which the Court addressed direct public funding of
religiously affiliated colleges and universities-Tilton v.
Richardson,' Hunt v. McNair,2 and Roemer v. Board of
t Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio.
1. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
2. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
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Public Works of Maryland.3 While the analysis in these
cases appeared both internally consistent and compatible
with the existing jurisprudence, in reality it was neither.
Part II discusses some of the more recent cases in lower
courts in which state funding of sectarian higher education
has been challenged, noting how some of the lower courts
claim that the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence vitiates
the Tilton-Hunt-Roemer analysis. Ironically, given the utter
lack of clarity of the Tilton-Roemer line of cases, the current
treatment in the lower courts might plausibly be viewed as
either an application or a repudiation of the established
jurisprudence-all that is clear is that the establishment
clause limitations on public funding of sectarian colleges
and universities, as applied, are so weak that they do
virtually no work and may only serve to further dilute
establishment clause guarantees more generally.
I. THE AID-TO-HIGHER-EDUCATION TRILOGY OF CASES
Between 1971 and 1976, the Court decided three
important cases dealing with aid to religiously affiliated
institutions of higher learning-Tilton v. Richardson,4 Hunt
v. McNair,5 and Roemer v. Board of Public Works of
Maryland.6 The Court offered a test by which to decide
whether establishment clause guarantees were violated by
state aid to such institutions, in each instance finding that
the institutions in question were not pervasively sectarian
and that the aid at issue did not violate constitutional
guarantees. Yet, the analyses offered by the Court were
consistent only in that they yielded the same result-
factors thought important in one case were ignored in
another and rationales deemed practically dispositive in
these cases would have been viewed as irrelevant in other
establishment clause contexts. The Court thereby not only
offered very little helpful guidance to lower courts but
belied its own commitment to apply the relevant criteria
and undercut its own credibility in an important area of
law.
3. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
4. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
5. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
6. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
[Vol. 56354
DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS
A. Tilton v. Richardson
The first important case in the establishment clause
aid-to-higher-education context is Tilton v. Richardson in
which the Court examined a provision of the Higher
Education Facilities Act (HEFA) providing funds for the
construction of academic facilities at institutions of higher
learning.7 The HEFA was challenged as a violation of
establishment clause guarantees because federal funds
were being used for projects at four institutions,8 each of
which was sponsored by a religious organization. 9
As an initial matter, the Court addressed whether
Congress intended the funds to be available to religious as
well as secular institutions. Because Congress had defined
the institutions of higher learning that were eligible to
receive funds in "broad and inclusive terms,"' 0 and because
Congress had made clear which institutions it wanted to
exclude, namely, private, for-profit institutions,1 there was
reason to think that religious institutions were also eligible
for these government subsidies. Further, sponsors of the bill
had said that they intended to include religious institutions
as potential recipients, 12 and attempts to exclude such
institutions by amendment were defeated.' 3 The Court
concluded that Congress had "intended the Act to include
all colleges and universities regardless of any affiliation
7. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 674-75.
8. Id. at 676 ("Federal funds were used for five projects at these four
institutions: (1) a library building at Sacred Heart University; (2) a music,
drama, and arts building at Annhurst College; (3) a science building at Fairfield
University; (4) a library building at Fairfield; and (5) a language laboratory at
Albertus Magnus College.").
9. Id. ("The sponsorship of these institutions by religious organizations is
not disputed.").
10. Id. at 676-77.
11. See id. at 677 ("Certain institutions, for example, institutions that are
neither public nor nonprofit, are expressly excluded.").
12. See id. ("Although there was extensive debate on the wisdom and
constitutionality of aid to institutions affiliated with religious organizations,
Congress clearly included them in the program. The sponsors of the Act so
stated. . . ." (citing 109 CONG. REC. 19218 (1963) (remarks of Sen. Morse); id. at
14954 (remarks of Rep. Powell); id. at 14963 (remarks of Rep. Quie))).
13. See id. ("[A]mendments aimed at the exclusion of church-related
institutions were defeated." (citation omitted)).
20081 355
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with or sponsorship by a religious body. 14
Once it was established that the HEFA authorized
grants to religiously affiliated institutions, the Court then
analyzed whether the government's providing that funding
was compatible with establishment clause guarantees. That
analysis was in light of the relevant "test," although the
Court cautioned against reading too much into that term,15
suggesting that the announced standards were simply
guidelines in light of which constitutional violations might
be identified.'6
Emphasizing that there are no clear, hard-and-fast
rules in the area, the Court noted that it could "only dimly
perceive the boundaries of permissible government activity
in this sensitive area."' 7 The Court then suggested that it
would consider the following questions when determining
whether the challenged Act passes constitutional muster:
"First, does the Act reflect a secular legislative purpose?
Second, is the primary effect of the Act to advance or inhibit
religion? Third, does the administration of the Act foster an
excessive government entanglement with religion? Fourth,
does the implementation of the Act inhibit the free exercise
of religion?"' 8
14. Id. at 676.
15. See id. at 678 (noting that there are "risks in treating criteria discussed
by the Court from time to time as 'tests' in any limiting sense of that term").
16. See id. (suggesting that the test should be viewed as providing
"guidelines with which to identify instances in which the objectives of the
Religion Clauses have been impaired").
17. Id. (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)).
18. Id. The Tilton Court quickly dispensed with the free exercise claim,
stating:
Appellants claim that the Free Exercise Clause is violated because they
are compelled to pay taxes, the proceeds of which in part finance grants
under the Act. Appellants, however, are unable to identify any coercion
directed at the practice or exercise of their religious beliefs .... Their
share of the cost of the grants under the Act is not fundamentally
distinguishable from the impact of the tax exemption sustained in
Walz, or the provision of textbooks upheld in Allen.
Tilton, 403 U.S. at 689 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S.
664 (1970); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968)). Because the
focus here is on the establishment clause and because free exercise discussion
does not play a role in any of the subsequent cases, there will be no further
discussion of free exercise guarantees.
356 [Vol. 56
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1. Is There a Secular Purpose? The Court dispensed
with the first question rather quickly. Congress had said in
the preamble of the HEFA that:
"[T]he security and welfare of the United States require that this
and future generations of American youth be assured ample
opportunity for the fullest development of their intellectual
capacities, and that this opportunity will be jeopardized unless the
Nation's colleges and universities are encouraged and assisted in
their efforts to accommodate rapidly growing numbers of youth
who aspire to a higher education."19
The Court concluded that providing the growing
numbers of America's youth with higher education
opportunities was a "legitimate secular objective entirely
appropriate for governmental action."20 The Court saw no
need to second-guess Congress's rejection of the proposition
that the relevant educational needs could be served by
providing funds to public and to private, nonsectarian, non-
profit institutions. Rather, the Court accepted that there
was a growing need for educational services and that the
federal government's providing funds to aid construction
projects at colleges and universities was well-suited to
promote that end. After all, the Court noted, the funds were
only to be used for "secular educational purposes," 21 which
suggested that it was not Congress's purpose to circumvent
constitutional limitations by underwriting religious
instruction.
2. Is the Primary Effect of the Act to Advance or Inhibit
Religion? While the Court was confident that Congress's
purposes were legitimate, a separate issue involved
whether the effects of the legislation would pass
constitutional muster. First, the Court clarified the
"Effects" inquiry. To establish that Congress's providing
financial support had a constitutionally impermissible
effect, it would not suffice to point out that religious
institutions would receive some benefit from the financial
19. Id. at 678 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 701 (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No. 92-
318, § 161, 86 Stat. 235, 303 (1972)).
20. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679.
21. Id. at 674-75.
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outlay.22 Rather, the relevant concern was whether the
program's "principal or primary effect advances religion. 23
To justify its conclusion that there was no
constitutional violation, the Court noted that the act at
issue had been drafted carefully to assure that only secular
and not religious functions would be subsidized. 24 Indeed,
the HEFA expressly prohibited the use of funds for
"religious instruction, training, or worship. ' 25 While the
Court recognized that construction grants would benefit
any recipient institution in that the new buildings would
help institutions perform various functions, 26 the provision
of secular aid to religious institutions had previously been
upheld by the Court,27 and the Court saw nothing making
this kind of aid constitutionally objectionable.
Even a well-crafted statute might have effects which
violate constitutional guarantees-the Court recognized
that legitimate goals might be undercut by "conscious
design or lax enforcement. '28 However, the mere possibility
that abuses might occur would not justify striking down the
legislation. 29 Rather, the Court implied, there would have to
be some evidence that the legitimate purposes were being
undermined before the HEFA could be invalidated as a
violation of constitutional guarantees.
The Court offered two reasons to justify its confidence
that the HEFA's secular purposes were in fact being served.
First, the oversight mechanism incorporated within the Act
seemed to be working, because some institutions not before
22. See id. at 679 (rejecting the "simplistic argument that every form of
financial aid to church-sponsored activity violates the Religion Clauses").
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 679-80.
26. See id. at 679.
27. See id. ("But bus transportation, textbooks, and tax exemptions all gave
aid in the sense that religious bodies would otherwise have been forced to find
other sources from which to finance these services. Yet all of these forms of
governmental assistance have been upheld." (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947); Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970))).
28. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679.
29. See id. ("[J]udicial concern about these possibilities cannot, standing
alone, warrant striking down a statute as unconstitutional.").
358 [Vol. 56
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the Court had been forced to return monies which had been
used improperly.30 Second, there was no evidence that the
institutions before the Court had engaged in prohibited
activities. For example, the Court expressly noted that
there had been no religious services conducted in the
federally financed buildings, 31 there had been no religious
symbols or plaques on the walls,3 2 and there had been no
evidence that the buildings had been used for anything
other than nonreligious purposes. 33 The Court concluded
that as far as the record was concerned, "these buildings
are indistinguishable from a typical state university
facility."34
Of course, the mere fact that there were no religious
symbols on the walls and that no religious services had
been held in the rooms would not end the inquiry if, for
example, the courses incorporated religious instruction.
Indeed, the plaintiffs argued that the education at these
institutions was pervasively religious 35 and that all classes
promoted the religious objectives of the schools,36 which
meant at the very least that the government's funding the
building of any classrooms would support the schools'
religious mission.
The Court rejected the contention that federal funds
were being used to support religious instruction in the
schools at issue, noting that two of the five financed
buildings were libraries in which no classes had been
held. 37 Thus, even had it been true that the schools at issue
30. See id. at 680 (noting that the "restrictions have been enforced in the
Act's actual administration, and the record shows that some church-related
institutions have been required to disgorge benefits for failure to obey them").
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See id. at 676 ( "[The plaintiffs had] attempted to show that the four
recipient institutions were 'sectarian' by introducing evidence of their relations
with religious authorities, the content of their curricula, and other indicia of
their religious character.").
36. See id. at 680 (explaining that the Plaintiffs had argued that "religion so
permeates the secular education provided by [these] church-related colleges and
universities that their religious and secular educational functions are in fact
inseparable").
37. Id. at 681.
2008] 359
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were pervasively sectarian, it could not have been claimed
that federal funds were being used to support religious
instruction if those funds were only used for buildings in
which no classes would be held. Of course, there are other
ways in which religious instruction might be aided in a
library, for example, if the institution imposed severe
restrictions on the acquisition of books. However, no
evidence was presented establishing or even implying the
existence of institutionally imposed restrictions on the
books that these libraries could acquire. 38
There was no discussion in the Tilton opinion about
whether an institution that did impose restrictions on
library acquisitions would thereby make itself ineligible for
federal funding of its library construction. The Court's
reticence on this subject was unsurprising, given the lack of
evidence of any such restrictions at these schools. What
might seem more surprising, however, was that the Court
did not consider any other factors when deciding whether
the library construction funding violated constitutional
guarantees. Suppose, for example, that there had been only
religious books in the collection. Even were this limited
selection a result of something other than institutional
mandate-for example, it was due instead to the choices
consistently made by those who had been selected to be in
charge of book acquisitions-it nonetheless might suggest
that the government's providing funds for a new library
would in fact promote the religious mission of the school. 39
The point here is not to claim that these institutions in
particular would or did in fact limit their holdings to
38. Id.
39. Cf. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd. of Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson
County, 117 F. Supp. 2d 693, 729 (M.D. Tenn. 2000), rev'd, 301 F.3d 401 (6th
Cir. 2002). There, the court stated:
People objecting to the bond issue pointed to the religious collections
housed in Lipscomb's library and argued that providing financing for a
new library would serve to advance the religious nature of Lipscomb ....
While the court recognizes that a government-funded library may well
contain a number of religious books without serving to advance religion
in any way, there is a distinction between a library containing a
general collection of religious materials as a small part of its collection
and a library whose collection contains a substantial number of
religious works which are largely dedicated to a particular faith.
360 [Vol. 56
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religious books,40 but merely that the Court might have
engaged in a more searching inquiry before concluding that
federal guarantees had not been violated. Lower courts
considering analogous cases in the future would look to the
Court's analysis for guidance, and the guidance provided
suggested that a cursory examination of the local practices
was all that was required.
A different issue not even considered by the Court was
whether the library might be used in other ways to further
religious objectives. For example, libraries might house
administrative offices and those offices might be used in
ways that promote a school's religious objectives. 41 While
there was no suggestion that the school libraries at issue
had housed offices promoting religious goals, the Court's
having explicitly considered this possibility would have
alerted lower courts to the kinds of uses that would be
constitutionally precluded, and also would have suggested
that the Court was taking its constitutional role seriously.
The other buildings whose construction was at least
partially funded by federal monies did have classes in them.
One of these buildings was a language laboratory, 42 which
was to be used to help students with their pronunciation of
modern foreign languages. 43 The Court was confident that
this building would not be used in a way which would
40. For example, Fairfield University currently seems to have a wealth of
non-religious books, judging from their on-line catalog, available at iLink at
Fairfield University, http://sirsi.fairfield.edul (last visited Apr. 23, 2008). The
same might be said of Sacred Heart University. Ryan-Matura Library, Sacred
Heart University, http://library.sacredheart.edu (last visited Apr. 23, 2008).
Federal funds were used to help these two schools build their libraries. See
Tilton, 403 U.S. at 676. A separate question of course is whether the current
wealth of selection existed at the time this case was litigated.
41. Cf. Steele, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 730:
Some of the bond loan funds also were used by Lipscomb to renovate
the old library into administrative offices. Although the evidence does
not contain a list of the current occupants of the new administration
building, it is reasonable to infer that at least some whose offices are
there are involved in the religious mission of the school. A number of
the administrative offices have some responsibility for overseeing the
daily Bible and chapel requirements and in hiring faculty members
who adhere to the religious beliefs of Lipscomb.
42. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 681 ("The third building was a language
laboratory at Albertus Magnus College.").
43. Id.
2008] 361
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violate constitutional guarantees, because its function was
"peculiarly unrelated and unadaptable to religious
indoctrination."44 Yet, the Court offered no reason to
support its belief that a modern language laboratory would
be immune from abuse. For example, students might be
taught to say prayers in modern foreign languages, and this
would presumably violate constitutional guarantees. The
point here is not that Albertus Magnus College was using
its language laboratory to perform religious
indoctrination, 45 but that the Court offered a merely
cursory analysis when attempting to determine whether
federal funds were being used in ways that violate the
establishment clause. The Court's having considered the
ways in which a language laboratory might be misused and
then having noted that there was no evidence of such
misuse by the college both would have made the Court's
analysis more persuasive and would have been more helpful
to lower courts faced with similar challenges in the future.
The Court's analysis of the constitutionality of the
funding of the other two buildings-a science building46 and
a building for music, drama, and arts47-was no less
disappointing. The appellants had "introduced several
institutional documents that stated certain religious
restrictions on what could be taught."48 However, the Court
noted that there was some evidence showing that "these
restrictions were not in fact enforced and that the schools
were characterized by an atmosphere of academic freedom
rather than religious indoctrination. '' 49 After all, the Court
noted that each of the institutions subscribed to the "1940
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure
endorsed by the American Association of University
Professors and the Association of American Colleges. 50
44. Id.
45. Albertus Magnus was the college whose language laboratory was being
built using federal funds. See id.
46. See id. ("Federal grants were also used to build a science building at
Fairfield University.").
47. See id. ("Federal grants were also used to build... a music, drama, and
arts building at Annhurst College.").
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 681-82.
[Vol. 56362
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Yet, the Court's citing to the Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom and Tenure (Principles) is not
particularly reassuring when one considers that the
Principles include the following:
Teachers are entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing
their subject, but they should be careful not to introduce into their
teaching controversial matter which has no relation to their
subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or
At.hpr nims nf t.h in. t.fitinn qhould be clearly stated in writing at
the time of the appointment. 5 1
The Tilton Court noted within the opinion that the
schools at issue had written policies imposing religious
restrictions on what could be taught, 52 so it would not have
violated the Principles for a school to have disciplined an
individual for expressing disfavored views in the classroom.
Discipline might be especially likely to be imposed if the
expressed views had been characterized by the institution
as "controversial" and having had no relation to the subject
of the course.
On first blush, it might seem eminently reasonable to
discipline someone for articulating views having no relation
to the course subject matter. Why, it might be thought,
should there be irrelevant discussions of social issues in a
mathematics class? Yet, relevance must be understood in
light of the background principle announced by these
schools that religion should be incorporated into the courses
as a general matter. Thus, religious views would appropriately
be included in any class, but anti-religious or other kinds of
nonreligious views would not.
Suppose, however, that there had been nothing in the
record about the imposition of discipline for "irrelevant,"
nonreligious discussion in the classroom. Even so, the very
possibility that such discipline could be imposed might
increase the likelihood that certain, but not other, views
would be expressed. 53 While schools are, of course, free to
51. 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE
WITH 1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS 3 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
52. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 681.
53. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (discussing the Virginia
Supreme Court's view that the lack of enforcement of a restrictive policy might
still have a chilling effect unless the decision not to enforce that policy was
2008] 363
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encourage views in accord with their religious mission and
discourage views contrary to that mission, a separate issue
is whether the state should be offering institutions financial
support to aid them in pursuing those goals.
The Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman54 discussed some of
the dangers that arise in the context of secondary religious
education: "We cannot ignore the danger that a teacher
under religious control and discipline poses to the
separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects
of precollege education."55 The Lemon Court was not
suggesting that teachers would consciously violate their
professional obligations and mix the secular with the
religious-the Court did not "assume that teachers in
parochial schools will be guilty of bad faith or any conscious
design to evade the limitations imposed by the statute and
the First Amendment. '56 Instead, the Court recognized that
a "dedicated religious person, teaching in a school affiliated
with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets,
will inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining
religiously neutral."57 Thus, a teacher even with the best of
intentions might find it difficult to "make a total separation
between secular teaching and religious doctrine. s58 Further,
it might not be so clear exactly where the relevant line
should be drawn, because what might "appear to some to be
essential to good citizenship might well for others border on
or constitute instruction in religion."5 9 Many of these same
points might analogously be made about instructors in
religious colleges or universities.
Given the difficulties in ascertaining the line between
the secular and the sectarian, even for those who have the
best of intentions, the Tilton Court's justification for its
conclusion that establishment clause guarantees had not
been violated by the funding at issue was at best surprising.
Even if particular courses were taught according to the
"academic requirements intrinsic to the subject matter and
promulgated).
54. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
55. Id. at 617.
56. Id. at 618.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 618-19.
59. Id. at 619.
364 [Vol. 56
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the individual teacher's concept of professional standards,"6 0
the individual teacher's concept of professional standards
might not provide a bulwark against religious indoctrination.
Indeed, it may well be that an individual teacher's concept
of professional standards would correspond to those of the
institution, and that both concepts would permit or require
the infusion of religious teaching into all aspects of the
curriculum.6 1
Suppose that federal funds were used to construct a
building including classrooms, and that classes in that
building included religious instruction. It should not matter
for constitutional purposes whether that religious teaching
occurred because it was viewed as permissible in light of
the teacher's own professional standards or, instead,
because the institution believed such instruction in keeping
with its mission. In either case, federal funds were being
used to promote religious indoctrination.
The Tilton Court noted that all four of the schools were
"governed by Catholic religious organizations, and the
faculties and student bodies at each [were] predominantly
Catholic."6 2 However, the Court seemed to think it relevant
that "non-Catholics were admitted as students and given
faculty appointments. '63 Yet, even were it true that there
were non-Catholic teachers who were not including
religious instruction within their courses, that would hardly
speak to whether Catholic teachers were promoting the
mission of the school by including religious teaching within
their courses. The establishment clause precludes state
funding of religious instruction, and there is no waiver of
that requirement merely because some teachers choose not
60. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681 (1971).
61. Cf. Thomas L. Shaffer, Erastian and Sectarian Arguments in Religiously
Affiliated American Law Schools, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1859, 1878 (1993) ("A
religiously affiliated law school cannot account for itself theologically by being
or aspiring to be like law schools maintained by the state or by non-religious
private sponsors. It cannot be faithful to itself and also be secular."). See John J.
Fitzgerald, Note, Today's Catholic Law Schools in Theory and Practice: Are We
Preserving Our Identity?, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 245, 245
(2001) ("[T]he Catholic law schools that train future lawyers have a
fundamental responsibility to take up Christ's call so that they may in turn
inculcate a sense of Christian mission in their students.").
62. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686.
63. Id.
2008] 365
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to include religious indoctrination within their courses.
Lemon had already warned against ignoring "the danger
that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses
to the separation of the religious from the purely secular. '64
Nor can it be claimed that Lemon had simply slipped
the Tilton Court's mind. First, the decisions were argued on
the same day,65 and issued on the same day. 66 Second,
Tilton specifically referred to Lemon in several places,
differentiating what was at issue in Tilton from what was
at issue in Lemon.67
Consider the issue of the potential political divisiveness
resulting from the funding of sectarian education. While the
Lemon Court had noted that "political debate and division,
however vigorous or even partisan, are [ordinarily] normal
and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of
government," 68  that same Court had cautioned that
"political division along religious lines was one of the
principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect. ' 69
If the Lemon Court was worried about political
divisiveness at the local level that might be caused by
funding religious education, one would think that the Court
would also have been concerned about potential political
divisiveness caused by Congress's appropriating monies on
the national level to help fund religious schooling. Yet, the
Tilton Court dismissed the political divisiveness concern
out of hand, simply noting that the appellants had not
pointed to "continuing religious aggravation on this
64. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617.
65. Tilton was argued on March 2 and 3, 1971, Tilton, 403 U.S. at 672;
Lemon was argued on March 3, 1971, Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
66. That day was June 28, 1971. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 672; Lemon, 403
U.S. at 602.
67. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 684-85 ("Our decision today in Lemon v. Kurtzman
and Robinson v. DiCenso has discussed and applied this independent measure
of constitutionality [entanglement] under the Religion Clauses."); id. at 687 ("In
Lemon and DiCenso, however, the state programs subsidized teachers, either
directly or indirectly."); id. at 688 ("No one of these three factors standing alone
is necessarily controlling; cumulatively all of them shape a narrow and limited
relationship with government which involves fewer and less significant contacts
than the two state schemes before us in Lemon and DiCenso.").
68. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
69. Id.
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matter,"70 and hypothesizing that perhaps the "potential for
divisiveness inherent in the essentially local problems of
primary and secondary schools is significantly less with
respect to a college or university whose student constituency
is not local but diverse and widely dispersed."71
One might have inferred from reading the Tilton
justification for worrying about political divisiveness on the
local but not on the national level that the Lemon Court
had pointed to evidence of continuing political divisiveness
along religious lines and that this divisiveness had been
particularly evident in certain localities. Yet, the Lemon
Court had not pointed to evidence of political divisiveness of
any sort, instead merely suggesting that where many pupils
attend church-affiliated schools, "it can be assumed that
state assistance will entail considerable political activity. ' 72
That activity will likely occur, the Court suggested, because
those promoting state support of parochial schools,
"understandably concerned with rising costs and sincerely
dedicated to both the religious and secular educational
missions of their schools, will inevitably champion this
cause and promote political action to achieve their goals. '73
In contrast, those who oppose state support of parochial
schools, "whether for constitutional, religious, or fiscal
reasons, will inevitably respond and employ all of the usual
political campaign techniques to prevail." 74
Yet, all of the points made by the Lemon Court might
be made analogously about funding of sectarian schools on
the national level. Further, the same points might be made
whether the funding of sectarian elementary or secondary
schools-or, instead, the funding of sectarian institutions of
higher education-was at issue. Colleges and universities
would also face rising costs and they, too, would have
supporters employing political methods to promote their
goals. Individuals who opposed Congress's supporting
religiously affiliated colleges and universities, whether for
constitutional, religious, or financial reasons, would also
marshal support for their cause. In short, the political
70. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 688.
71. Id. at 689.
72. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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divisiveness factor is no less persuasively employed on the
national level than it is on the local level.
As a way of bolstering its view that establishment
clause guarantees were not being violated, the Court
explained:
Although all four schools require their students to take theology
courses, the parties stipulated that these courses are taught
according to the academic requirements of the subject matter and
the teacher's concept of professional standards. The parties also
stipulated that the courses covered a range of human religious
experiences and are not limited to courses about the Roman
Catholic religion. The schools introduced evidence that they made
no attempt to indoctrinate students or to proselytize. Indeed, some
of the required theology courses at Albertus Magnus and Sacred
Heart are taught by rabbis. 75
Here, one cannot tell whether the Court is seeking to
establish that the schools do not promote a particular
religion or that the schools do not promote religion generally.
That courses cover a range of religious experiences might
give one confidence that the theology course would not cover
one religion exclusively, although one still might want to
know whether one religion was privileged over the others,
for example, by the teacher's discussing several religions
but then concluding that there was only one true religion.
Even were the course not designed to privilege certain
religions over others, a separate question would be whether
the course was designed to promote religion generally
rather than make it a subject of academic focus. If so, then
the establishment clause would still be violated, even if no
one religion was promoted at the expense of others. As the
Court explained in Capitol Square Review and Advisory
Board v. Pinette76: "The establishment clause does not
merely prohibit the State from favoring one religious sect
over others. It also proscribes state action supporting the
establishment of a number of religions, as well as the official
endorsement of religion in preference to nonreligion." 77
Thus, even were the Court correct that the theology courses
at these institutions were not designed to promote
75. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686-87.
76. 515 U.S. 753 (1995).
77. Id. at 809 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-55 (1985)).
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Catholicism in particular, that would not settle the issue.
The question still would be whether the courses were
discussing religion on the one hand or promoting religion on
the other. 78 The Court simply refused to address the more
difficult issue for establishment clause purposes.
3. Entanglement. The Tilton Court also considered
whether the Act would cause excessive entanglement
between church and state. As part of its justification for
why it did not, the Court noted that there is "substance to
the contention that college students are less impressionable
and less susceptible to religious indoctrination, '" 79 reasoning
that the "skepticism of the college student is not an
inconsiderable barrier to any attempt or tendency to
subvert the congressional objectives and limitations. '"8 0 Yet,
this is an unusual interpretation of both constitutional and
congressional objectives and limitations, because it implies
that the Constitution's and Congress's focus of concern is to
prevent successful indoctrination. Were the focus of concern
instead that public funds not be used to promote religious
teaching or worship, that concern would not be allayed
merely because the target audience was hard to persuade.
Thus, while it may well be true that college students are
not as impressionable as schoolchildren,8 ' that point relates
to whether the religious teaching will alter the views of the
78. Cf. Leslie Griffin, "We Do Not Preach. We Teach. "- Religion Professors
and the First Amendment, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 45 (2000) ("Religious studies
is not evangelism; one of its defining characteristics is its secularity.").
79. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686.
80. Id.; see also Richard D. Winders, Casenote, Building on the Establishment
Clause: Government Conduit Financing of Construction Projects at Religiously
Affiliated Schools in Johnson v. Economic Development Corp., 35 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1151, 1171 (2002) ("The Court referred to the less impressionable and
more skeptical nature of students of higher education resulting in a greater
barrier to religious indoctrination . . . ."); F. King Alexander & Klinton W.
Alexander, The Reassertion of Church Doctrine in American Higher Education:
The Legal and Fiscal Implications of the Ex Corde Ecclesiae for Catholic
Colleges and Universities in the United States, 29 J.L. & EDUC. 149, 163 (2000)
("The Court also argued that primary and secondary school students were more
vulnerable to being indoctrinated into a particular faith because they were
younger and less experienced in the ways of the world than the average college-
aged student.").
81. But see Julie K. Underwood, Changing Establishment Analysis Within
and Outside the Context of Education, 33 How. L.J. 53, 104 (1990) ("Are
children really less susceptible to the inculcation of religion in their first year of
college than they are in their last year of high school?").
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students rather than to whether the state should be
supporting an attempt to indoctrinate religion.
Suppose, for example, that a particular town were to
erect a cross on top of city hall.8 2 Would that only be
impermissible if doing so was thought likely to change
individuals' beliefs? Presumably, this would violate
establishment clause guarantees even if no one's religious
views were affected and the only result was that certain
people seeing the display would then feel like political
outsiders.83
The Court contrasted Lemon and Tilton by suggesting
that because "teachers are not necessarily religiously
neutral, greater governmental surveillance would be
required to guarantee that state salary aid would not in fact
subsidize religious instruction. 8 4 However, because "the
Government provides facilities that are themselves
religiously neutral, .. . [t]he risks of Government aid to
religion and the corresponding need for surveillance are
therefore reduced."8 5 Yet, this analysis simply will not
stand. The Court has suggested that classrooms whose
construction was funded in part by the federal government
cannot be used to indoctrinate religion. If that is so, then
the fact that teachers are not necessarily religiously neutral
would speak to the necessity of greater governmental
surveillance of those federally funded classrooms, precisely
because the teachers might use those classrooms to engage
in religious instruction.
The Act specified that "no part of the project may be
used for sectarian instruction, religious worship, or the
82. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("I doubt
not, for example, that the Clause forbids a city to permit the permanent
erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall.").
83. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,
799 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens explained:
It is especially important to take account of the perspective of a
reasonable observer who may not share the particular religious belief it
expresses. A paramount purpose of the Establishment Clause is to
protect such a person from being made to feel like an outsider in
matters of faith, and a stranger in the political community.
Id.
84. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687-88.
85. Id. at 688.
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programs of a divinity school,"8 6 and the Court noted that
the "restrictions have been enforced in the Act's actual
administration, and the record shows that some church-
related institutions have been required to disgorge benefits
for failure to obey them. 87 Yet, this suggests that the
buildings might well be misused, and that oversight might
well be required. Precisely because instructors might feel
implicit or explicit institutional pressure to include religion
within their courses or might feel that they should include
such materials either because of their internalized
professional standards or, perhaps, their individual
consciences, there is a danger that religious indoctrination
would take place. Without oversight, that indoctrination
might well occur in federally financed buildings. While all
else being equal, a reduction in entanglement between
church and state is better for all concerned, all else is not
equal if the entanglement reduction would increase the
likelihood that federal funds would be misused to promote
religious indoctrination.
There are at least two distinct ways in which federal
funds might be misused: (1) the building whose construction
was made possible by federal funds might be used in ways
prohibited by statute, or (2) the funds themselves might be
misappropriated. Not only was the Tilton Court confident
that the buildings would be used for their intended
purposes, but the Court seemed relatively confident that
the funds would be used to help fund the cost of the
buildings, noting that another reason that there would be
less entanglement required was that "the Government aid
here is a one-time, single purpose construction grant. 8 8
Consider two kinds of grants: (1) a one-time grant, and
(2) a grant involving partial payments over several years.
The Court suggested that there was less need to monitor
the former than the latter, perhaps thinking that the one-
time grant would immediately be dispensed to those
responsible for designing and constructing the buildings at
hand.8 9 However, if the one-time allocation was put into an
86. Id. at 675.
87. Id. at 680.
88. Id. at 688.
89. See id. ("[Tihe Government aid here is a one-time, single-purpose
construction grant. There are no continuing financial relationships or
2008]
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account and the funds were dispensed from that account
over several years, then the one-time grant would be
functionally equivalent to the grant involving partial
payments over several years, at least with respect to the
need to monitor those funds to make sure that they were
going towards the construction of buildings rather than
other expenses not contemplated within the purposes for
the provision of the grant.
Where government funds are provided to religious
institutions, there are at least two reasons that there might
be entanglement: (1) to assure that the funds were in fact
going to the designated purpose rather than to some other
use, and (2) to assure that the building constructed with
federal funds would be used only for the designated
purposes. Once the federal funds had been spent, it would
no longer be necessary to continue surveillance to assure
the fulfillment of the first purpose, but it still would be
necessary to continue to monitor to assure that the second
purpose would be served.
Justice Douglas explained in his Tilton dissent that
"surveillance creates an entanglement of government and
religion which the First Amendment was designed to
avoid."90 However, he noted, using federal funds to pay for
the construction of buildings at religious institutions would
seem to require "surveillance which will last for the useful
life of the building."91 Indeed, the Tilton Court implicitly
recognized the force of Justice Douglas's point when
striking down one provision of the Higher Education
Facilities Act.
The Act had provided that if an institution violated the
terms of the agreement and used a building whose
construction was supported by federal funds for religious
services, the government would receive a partial refund.92
However, the government was entitled to receive monies
back only if the violation occurred within twenty years of
dependencies, no annual audits, and no government analysis of an institution's
expenditures on secular as distinguished from religious activities.").
90. Id. at 694 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 682 (majority opinion) ("If a recipient institution violates any of
the statutory restrictions on the use of a federally financed facility, § 754(b)(2)
permits the Government to recover an amount equal to the proportion of the
facility's present value that the federal grant bore to its original cost.").
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the completion of the building. 93 This meant that a building
whose construction was made possible through the use of
federal funds could be used for religious worship as long as
twenty years had elapsed since its completion. 94 Because
the useful life of the building would probably extend for
more than twenty years, the provision would in effect
permit the use of government funds to construct buildings
to be used for religious purposes-as long as the institution
waited the requisite twenty years.95 The Court noted: "If, at
the end of 20 years, the building is, for example, converted
into a chapel or otherwise used to promote religious
interests, the original federal grant will in part have the
effect of advancing religion."96 This, the Court held, violated
constitutional guarantees. 97 Yet, if the Court understood
that it would be impermissible for the buildings to be used
for religious purposes during the life of the building, then it
is not clear why Justice Douglas was incorrect in asserting
that supervision-and the accompanying entanglement-
would also be necessary during those years.
The claim here is not that the schools at issue in Tilton
used the monies in a way that violated establishment
clause guarantees, but that the Court's justifications for
93. See id. at 683 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 754(a) (1970), repealed by Pub. L. No.
92-318, § 161, 86 Stat. 235, 303 (1972)), stating that:
This remedy, however, is available to the Government only if the
statutory conditions are violated "within twenty years after completion
of construction." This 20-year period is termed by the statute as "the
period of Federal interest" and reflects Congress' finding that after 20
years "the public benefit accruing to the United States" from the use of
the federally financed facility "will equal or exceed in value" the
amount of the federal grant.
94. Id. ("Under § 754(b)(2), therefore, a recipient institution's obligation not
to use the facility for sectarian instruction or religious worship would appear to
expire at the end of 20 years.").
95. The Court stated:
Limiting the prohibition for religious use of the structure to 20 years
obviously opens the facility to use for any purpose at the end of that
period. It cannot be assumed that a substantial structure has no value
after that period and hence the unrestricted use of a valuable property
is in effect a contribution of some value to a religious body.
Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. ("To this extent the Act therefore trespasses on the Religion
Clauses.").
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why the establishment clause had not been violated sent a
signal that the relevant test in the context of higher
education was so weak that colleges and universities might
be eligible to receive state funding even if those funds
would indeed be used to promote religion. The Court did
little to undermine that signal in subsequent cases.
B. Hunt v. McNair
Hunt v. McNair98 involved a South Carolina program in
which the state created an Educational Facilities Authority
(EFA) to assist colleges and universities in financing their
construction projects.99 The advantage for higher education
institutions in making use of the EFA was that the interest
on the bonds used to raise money was tax exempt, 100
thereby enabling the school "to market the bonds at a
significantly lower rate of interest than the educational
institution would be forced to pay if it borrowed the money
by conventional private financing."101 Basically, the EFA
would issue bonds for the desired building improvements,
for which the state assumed no direct or indirect
obligation.1 02 The institution would convey without charge
the portion of the campus to be improved to the EFA, and
the EFA would lease back that part of the campus to the
institution. After the bonds had been paid in full, the EFA
would convey the property back to the institution. 103
98. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
99. Id. at 736 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-41.4 (1971)).
100. See id. at 739.
101. Id.
102. See id. at 737 ("While revenue bonds to be used in connection with a
project are issued by the Authority, the Act is quite explicit that the bonds shall
not be obligations of the State, directly or indirectly."); see also id. at 738
("Moreover, since all of the expenses of the Authority must be paid from the
revenues of the various projects in which it participates ... none of the general
revenues of South Carolina is used to support a project." (citation omitted)).
103. See id. at 738, explaining that:
Under the proposal, the Authority would issue the bonds and make the
proceeds available to the College for use in connection with a portion of
its campus to be designated a project (the Project) within the meaning
of the Act. In return, the College would convey the Project, without
cost, to the Authority, which would then lease the property so conveyed
back to the College. After payment in full of the bonds, the Project
would be reconveyed to the College.
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The act creating the EFA included a provision
specifying that monies raised by the issuance of these bonds
could not be used to construct buildings where there would
be sectarian instruction or religious worship.10 4 To assure
that the property would not be used for sectarian purposes
once the institution had regained title to it, the EFA was
authorized by the agreement to conduct inspections to
assure that the property was not being used improperly. 105
The Hunt Court began its analysis by reaffirming that
the Lemon test would determine whether there had been an
establishment clause violation, 106 although the Court
characterized the three prongs of that test as "no more than
helpful signposts."107 The Court quickly dispensed with the
purpose prong, observing that the statute's purpose "is
manifestly a secular one."108 After all, the "benefits of the
Act are available to all institutions of higher education in
South Carolina, whether or not having a religious
affiliation."109 Thus, there was no claim that the South
Carolina Legislature was secretly trying to aid religious
institutions by passing the act in question.
When deciding what the primary effect was, the Court
did not consider the primary effect of the statute generally,
for example, providing lower cost loans for construction
projects to colleges and universities in the state. Rather, to
ascertain the primary effect of the statute, the Court would
narrow its "focus from the statute as a whole to the only
transaction presently before [it]." 0
On first blush, it might seem that the Court's
narrowing its focus to the primary effect of the statute with
respect to the Baptist College of Charleston 1 ' would almost
104. See id. at 736-37.
105. Id. at 739-40 ("To insure that this covenant is honored, each lease
agreement must allow the Authority to conduct inspections, and any
reconveyance to the College must contain a restriction against use for sectarian
purposes.").
106. See id. at 741.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 742.
111. See id. at 736.
2008] 375
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
necessitate a finding that the statute's primary effect would
be to promote religion. After all, the monies saved by
offering a lower return for tax-exempt bonds would give the
college the opportunity to use those monies for other uses
more sectarian in nature. Yet, the Hunt Court expressly
rejected the contention that funding was prohibited if "aid
to one aspect of an institution frees it to spend its other
resources on religious ends. '112 Indeed, the Court offered a
rather narrow definition of what would constitute the
primary effect of advancing religion-"[a]id normally may
be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion
when it flows to an institution in which religion is so
pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are
subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a
specifically religious activity in an otherwise substantially
secular setting."113 Thus, aid will have the primary effect of
advancing religion only when it is actually used to promote
religion either because the aid is specifically used to fund a
sectarian program or because it goes to an institution that
is so pervasively religious that the aid to that institution
cannot help but promote religion.
The Court considered whether the institution before it
was "pervasively sectarian,"1 4 noting that no evidence had
been presented that would justify so categorizing that
institution. 1 5 The Court noted that the members of the
Board of Trustees were elected by the South Carolina
Baptist Convention, that the approval of the Convention
was required for certain financial transactions," 6 and that
the college's charter might only be amended by the
Convention. 117 However, there were no religious qualifications
for faculty membership or student admission. 118 The Court
concluded that on the record there was "no basis to conclude
that the College's operations are oriented significantly
towards sectarian rather than secular education,"" 9
112. Id. at 743.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 743-44.
119. Id. at 744.
376 [Vol. 56
DEATH BYA THOUSAND CUTS
although that may have been because there was relatively
little in the record. 120 Nonetheless, because the institution
had not itself been found to be pervasively sectarian and
because the statute expressly excluded "any buildings or
facilities used for religious purposes,"'121 the Court rejected
that the statute would be providing aid to religious rather
than secular college activities. 22 The Court compared the
record before it to the record before the Tilton Court, noting
that there was "no evidence here to demonstrate that the
College is any more an instrument of religious indoctrination
than were the colleges and universities involved in
Tilton."'123 Thus, given the deferential stance adopted in
Tilton combined with the scant record before the Hunt
Court, the Court did not have enough evidence to support
the contention that the Baptist College of Charleston was
pervasively sectarian.
The entanglement issue implicated in Hunt differed
from that in Tilton because, in Hunt, the South Carolina
EFA was empowered to:
determine the location and character of any project financed under
the act; to construct, maintain, manage, operate, lease as lessor or
lessee, and regulate the same; to enter into contracts for the
management and operation of such project; to establish rules and
regulations for the use of the project or any portion thereof; and to
fix and revise from time to time rates, rents, fees, and charges for
the use of a project and for the services furnished or to be
furnished by a project or any portion thereof. In other words, the
College turns over to the State Authority control of substantial
parts of the fiscal operation of the school-its very life's blood. 124
Thus, the EFA in Hunt might become "deeply involved
in the day-to-day financial and policy decisions of the
College"'125 in a way that was not even potentially
implicated in Tilton. However, the Hunt Court rejected that
there was "a realistic likelihood that [the EFA's powers]
120. See id. at 743.
121. Id. at 744.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 746.
124. Id. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 747 (majority opinion).
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would be exercised in their full detail,"126 instead accepting
that the EFA would only step in if "the College fails to make
the prescribed rental payments or otherwise defaults in its
obligations."127
There were two different respects in which the EFA
might be thought to be too deeply entangled in the affairs of
the college-one involved the day-to-day financial decisions
and the other involved decisions about the inclusion of
religious materials in particular. 128 Justice Brennan argued
in his dissent that the "content of courses taught in
facilities financed under the agreement must be closely
monitored by the State Authority in discharge of its duty to
ensure that the facilities are not being used for sectarian
instruction."'' 29 However, the Court reasoned that the
required entanglement in Hunt would be no more
burdensome than the required entanglement in Tilton, and
that, therefore, the statute could not be struck down on
these grounds. 130
Almost as an afterthought, the Hunt Court implied that
the fact that the state was not contributing any monies
directly to the school militated in favor of the
constitutionality of the program. 131 However, that factor
seemed to play no role in the analysis, and so it seems likely
that the same result would have been reached even had the
monies been loaned or given directly to the school. 132
126. Id.
127. Id. at 748.
128. See id. at 745-46 ("Appellant argues that the Authority would become
involved in the operation of the College both by inspecting the project to insure
that it is not being used for religious purposes and by participating in the
management decisions of the College.").
129. Id. at 752 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 746 (majority opinion) ("A majority of the Court in Tilton, then,
concluded that on the facts of that case inspection as to use did not threaten
excessive entanglement. As we have indicated above, there is no evidence here
to demonstrate that the College is any more an instrument of religious
indoctrination than were the colleges and universities involved in Tilton.").
131. See id. at 738 ('Moreover, since all of the expenses of the Authority
must be paid from the revenues of the various projects in which it
participates . . . none of the general revenues of South Carolina is used to
support a project,"(citation omitted)).
132. See id. at 754 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Nor is the South Carolina
arrangement between the State and this College any less offensive to the
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Further, the Court's having mentioned this and nonetheless
having analyzed whether the funds would be used for
sectarian purposes undercuts the claim that the state's not
contributing public monies to the school should play an
important role in the analysis of whether such bond
programs comport with constitutional requirements. 133
The Court's mere mention of the fact that the state had
not directly given or loaned money to the school should be
contrasted with the role that this factor played in the South
Carolina Supreme Court decision in which the
constitutionality of the statute was upheld. 134 When that
court first heard the case, the court was considering a
challenge to the statute that was based on the supposition
that public funds were being used to benefit the school. 135
However, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted that no
public monies were involved 136 and, further, that the state's
credit could never be adversely affected. 137 In this opinion,
the South Carolina Supreme Court disposed of the
establishment clause objection in one paragraph, 38
Constitution because it involves, as the Court asserts, no direct financial
support to the College by the State."); see also Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426
U.S. 736, 764 (1976) ("[T]he form-of-aid distinctions of Tilton are thus of
questionable importance . . ").
133. But see infra notes 265-81 and accompanying text (discussing decisions
by different courts in which this factor is deemed important if not dispositive).
134. See Hunt v. McNair, 177 S.E.2d 362 (S.C. 1970), vacated, 403 U.S. 945
(1971).
135. See id. at 365, explaining that:
Plaintiff challenges that the Act is invalid on five grounds:
1. The undertaking by the State to finance private educational facilities
is not a public purpose for which the State may issue bonds;
2. The Act violates the first sentence of Section 6 of Article X which
states "[ ]the credit of the State shall not be pledged or loaned for the
benefit of any individual, company, association or corporation [ I."
3. The proposed actions of the Authority would deprive Plaintiff of
property without due process of law in violation of the provisions of
Section 5 of Article I of the South Carolina Constitution inasmuch as
the Authority would expend public funds for the benefit of a private
corporation.
(grounds four and five omitted).
136. Id. at 368.
137. See id.
138. Id. at 370.
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basically suggesting that because "neither the credit of the
State nor the property of the State is involved, it follows
that this constitutional provision is not violated."139
The United States Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the decision for reconsideration in light of Lemon
and Tilton.140 On remand, the South Carolina Supreme
Court reiterated its belief that there was no establishment
clause violation because neither the credit nor the property
of the state was involved. 141 The court distinguished
Lemon, 142 including an analysis downplaying the State's
oversight role:
The surveillance on the part of the State, obviously abhorred by
the Court, is not necessary under the proposed financing plan of
the college. The Court contemplates execution of a contract which
definitely establishes the rights of all parties to the agreement.
The State plays a passive and very limited role in the
implementation of the Act, serving principally as a mere conduit
through which institutions may borrow funds for the purposes of
the Act on a tax-free basis. 14 3
Yet, there are numerous respects in which it is
inaccurate to describe the state as a mere conduit. First, it
is not as if individuals were merely using the state as a
conduit as they would by sending checks through the
mail. 144 Rather, the state was making it possible for the
139. Id.
140. See Hunt v. McNair, 403 U.S. 945, 945 (1971) (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Earley v. DiCenso; Robinson v. DiCenso; Tilton
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)). Earley and Robinson were companion cases
to Lemon. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602.
141. See Hunt v. McNair, 187 S.E.2d 645, 648 (S.C. 1972) ("In our previous
opinion . . .we said: 'Having held that neither the credit of the State nor the
property of the State is involved, it follows that this constitutional provision
[the establishment clause] is not violated. There is no conflict between the
preservation of religious freedom and the preservation of higher education
under the Educational Facilities Authority Act."').
142. Id. at 649-50.
143. Id. at 650-51.
144. The United States Postal Service has been described as a "public-
private hybrid," which is "no longer simply a branch of the executive but a
federally chartered corporation operating under legislative guidelines." Richard
J. Hawkins, Comment, Dysfunctional Equivalence: The New Approach to
Defining "Postal Channels" under the Hague Service Convention, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 205, 228 n.126 (2007). Nonetheless, the point of the comparison remains.
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college to market bonds at a much lower interest rate,
thereby resulting in substantial savings for the school. 145
More important for purposes here, however, is that while
the South Carolina Supreme Court was correct that the
Court seemed to abhor some of the difficulties caused by
intrusive surveillance, that hardly justifies the state's
failing to fulfill its constitutional obligation by not engaging
in the surveillance. It should hardly be thought a virtue for
a state to fail to oversee whether state support is being used
to promote religious indoctrination, and establishment
clause jurisprudence is turned on its head if a state's
refusal to take an active role in overseeing whether funds
are being used properly is what enables the funding to pass
muster.
The South Carolina Supreme Court noted that the
college would convey "substantially all of the campus to the
State of South Carolina,"'146 although a few buildings were
excluded from that conveyance including "the Physical
Education Building, where facilities which are used for
religious worship are located."'147 The state supreme court
did not examine whether religious indoctrination was
included within the classes. The closest that the court came
to examining whether the college was pervasively sectarian
or to whether there would be impermissible instruction in
the classrooms was to note that there was "less potential for
experiencing the substantive evils which the religious
clauses were intended to protect than in [Tilton]."148 Part of
that conclusion may have rested on the composition of the
faculty and student body, which the court had noted in a
prior opinion was sixty percent Baptist, mirroring the ratio
of Baptists to non-Baptists in that part of the state. 49
It is not surprising that the state supreme court did not
include an analysis of the ways that the classes were
taught. In that court's view, the establishment clause
affords "protection against sponsorship, financial support
and active involvement of the government in religious
145. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
146. Hunt, 187 S.E.2d at 646.
147. Id. at 647.
148. Id. at 651.
149. See Hunt v. McNair, 177 S.E.2d 362, 369 (1970).
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activity."150  However, the court implied that those
protections were not even triggered, given the state's
"passive and very limited role." 151 Yet, one infers from the
Hunt Court's analysis that the state was sufficiently
involved in the funding to require an analysis of whether
there was religious indoctrination in the classroom.
That the South Carolina Supreme Court did not
address whether there was religious instruction in the
classroom was understandable, given its view that the
funding program did not trigger establishment clause
protections. However, the Hunt Court made clear that those
protections were triggered and thus that establishment
clause guarantees would be violated were the funds used to
promote religious instruction. At the very least, the United
States Supreme Court might have remanded the case to get
a more developed record with respect to what was going on
in the classroom, although that may not have been viewed
as a particularly attractive alternative given that the Court
had already remanded the case once before.
Tilton and Hunt together suggest that the Court takes
a very deferential view with respect to state funding of
religious higher education. Absent evidence of pervasive
sectarianism, the Court will likely uphold the
constitutionality of state funding of religious schools of
higher education as long as there has been no showing that
the funds are being used to promote religious instruction or
worship. Yet, this gives the state great incentive not to
engage in much oversight. There will then be no evidence of
impermissible indoctrination and the funding can be
upheld. Indeed, by noting that the record about how classes
were taught was rather spare15 2 but nonetheless upholding
the funding rather than remanding the case for further
150. Hunt, 187 S.E.2d at 648 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664
(1970)).
151. Id. at 650; see also Trent Collier, Note, Revenue Bonds and Religious
Education: The Constitutionality of Conduit Financing Involving Pervasively
Sectarian Institutions, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1108, 1114 (2002) (arguing that "a
government authority does not violate the Establishment Clause by issuing
revenue bonds to finance a loan to a pervasively sectarian institution because
such aid does not involve public funds, is neutrally available, and entails only a
minimal and largely indirect relationship between the government and the
pervasively sectarian institution").
152. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
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fact-finding, the Hunt Court sent an important message to
the states. Basically, the Court implied that it would not
insist that the state do much to assure that state funds
were not used to promote sectarian activities and that the
funding of non-pervasively-sectarian institutions would be
upheld, absent evidence that the funds were being used to
promote religious indoctrination or worship.
In both Tilton and Hunt, the Court implied that there
was little need for much oversight of post-secondary school
practices, presumably because college students were less
subject to indoctrination. 153 However, the Court did not
make clear whether the students being less subject to
indoctrination somehow immunized the attempts to
indoctrinate or, instead, made it less likely that schools
would try to indoctrinate, thereby obviating the need to
maintain strict supervision over the classes. The Court
helped answer that question in Roemer v. Board of Public
Works.154
C. Roemer v. Board of Public Works
At issue in Roemer was a statute authorizing annual
grants to private colleges, provided that the funds were not
used for sectarian purposes. 155 To assure that the monies
were used for their stated purposes, the state employed two
safeguards. First, it would simply exclude schools primarily
awarding theological or seminary degrees. 156 Second, with
respect to those schools still potentially qualifying for a
grant, the chief executive officer would have to sign an
affidavit stating that the funds would not be used for
sectarian purposes and describing the purposes for which
the monies would be used. 157 Further, a report would have
to be filed by the end of the fiscal year describing how the
153. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (discussing the Tilton
Court's reasoning); see also supra notes 123, 148 and accompanying text
(discussing why the school at issue in Hunt was comparable to the schools at
issue in Tilton and thus why the act at issue in Hunt should be upheld in light
of Tilton).
154. 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
155. Id. at 739.
156. See id. at 741-42.
157. Id. at 742.
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funds had been used. 158 The chief executive officer would
then have to certify that report and also file a supporting
affidavit stating that the funds had not been used for
sectarian purposes.159
Questions of sectarian use would be resolved on the
basis of affidavits, if possible. If that would not resolve this
issue, then the school might be subjected to a "quick and
non-judgmental" audit. which would take one day at
most. 160 The Roemer plurality noted that "religious
institutions need not be quarantined from public benefits
that are neutrally available to all," 16 1 emphasizing that
"[n]eutrality is what is required."'1 2 Basically, the plurality
suggested, as long as the state has a secular purpose and
does not promote or undermine religion, the state's funding
religious institutions will not violate the establishment
clause. 163 That said, however, facial neutrality and a
secular purpose provide no guarantee that state funding
will pass constitutional muster. 6 4 After all, the state is
constitutionally precluded from paying for religious
education. 165
Yet, Roemer suggests that the constitutionally required
protections against religious indoctrination at the
universitv level are minimal at best. For examule. the
Court understood that some of the classes at these
institutions began with a prayer 66 and, indeed, that a
majority of the classes at one of the institutions began with
prayer. 16 7 However, the Court did not hold that, therefore,
these institutions could not receive public funding,
reasoning instead that the funding was constitutional
because there was no institutional policy of encouraging
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 743.
161. Id. at 746.
162. Id. at 747.
163. See id.
164. Id. ("[A] secular purpose and a facial neutrality may not be enough, if
in fact the State is lending direct support to a religious activity.").
165. Id.
166. Id. at 756.
167. Id. (noting that a majority of classes at St. Joseph's began with prayer).
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prayer and the decision by an instructor to begin class with
a prayer was a matter of academic freedom. 168 The Court
thereby suggested that a teacher's beginning her class with
prayer in a publicly funded classroom was not constitutionally
significant as long as this was not mandated by school
policy. 16 9 In addition, the Court noted that some of the
instructors wore clerical garb when teaching, and that some
of the classrooms had religious symbols. 170 These very
factors were the kinds of factors that the Tilton Court
implied would militate in favor of a finding of pervasive
sectarianism. 171 Nonetheless, the Roemer Court upheld the
district court, finding that the colleges were not pervasively
sectarian, 72 at least in part because the curriculum covered
a wide spectrum of liberal arts courses 173 and because
religious indoctrination was not a substantial purpose of
the schools. 74
The Court accepted the finding below that the secular
could be separated from the sectarian,1 75 and then was
willing to assume that the funds would be used correctly. 176
168. Id. (quoting the district court, Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 387 F.
Supp. 1282, 1293 (1974)).
169. See Patrick B. Cates, Faith-Based Prisons and the Establishment
Clause: The Constitutionality of Employing Religion as an Engine of
Correctional Policy, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 777, 800 (2005) (noting that "while
some classes began with prayer, the school did not officially encourage the
practice"); David L. Gregory, Where to Pray? A Survey Regarding Prayer Rooms
in A.B.A. Accredited, Religiously Affiliated Law Schools, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1287, 1303 (1993) ("Although finding that theology courses were required as
part of the program, and even that some classes were begun with a prayer,
these facts did not trigger violations of the Establishment Clause.").
170. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 756 (quoting Roemer, 387 F. Supp. at 1293).
171. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
172. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 755 (quoting Roemer, 387 F. Supp. at 1293).
173. Id. at 756.
174. Id. at 755; see also Klint Alexander, The Road to Vouchers: The
Supreme Court's Compliance and the Crumbling of the Wall of Separation
between Church and State in American Education, 92 KY. L.J. 439, 457 (2004)
("[T]he Court closely scrutinized some of the day-to-day practices occurring on
some of the campuses, such as prayer in class, the hanging of religious symbols
in classrooms and even the 'wearing of clerical garb' by some of the instructors ...
[but] argued that none of these factors were significant because there was 'no
"actual college policy" of encouraging' these practices.").
175. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 759.
176. Id. at 760 ("We must assume that the colleges, and the Council, will
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The Court did not seem to believe that much monitoring
was required, suggesting that "secular activities, for the
most part, can be taken at face value. ' 177 For example, the
plurality believed that there was "no danger, or at least
only a substantially reduced danger, that an ostensibly
secular activity-the study of biology, the learning of a
foreign language, an athletic event-will actually be infused
with religious content or significance."'178 Yet, it would not
be surprising that a biology class might include religious
content, for example, by discussing whether or when human
embryos had become ensouled. 179 Further, while athletic
events might not seem particularly religious, prayers for
victory might be recited before or during such events.
Indeed, it might be noted that one of the few buildings on
the Baptist College of Charleston campus that was not
eligible for state funding was the physical education
building, which also housed the chapel.18 0
The Roemer plurality did not believe that the fact that
the subsidy would be annual rather than a one-time
contribution should be dispositive, even though that had
played an important role in Tilton.181 Nor did the Court
exercise their delegated control over use of the funds in compliance with the
statutory, and therefore the constitutional, mandate.").
177. Id. at 762.
178. Id.
179. Cf. Bd. of Ed. v. Allen 392 U.S. 236, 258 (1968) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas quoted a textbook used in grades seven through
twelve, which included the following:
To you an animal usually means a mammal, such as a cat, dog,
squirrel, or guinea pig. The new animal or embryo develops inside the
body of the mother until birth. The fertilized egg becomes an embryo or
developing animal. Many cell divisions take place. In time some cells
become muscle cells, others nerve cells or blood cells, and organs such
as eyes, stomach, and intestine are formed.
The body of a human being grows in the same way, but it is much
more remarkable than that of any animal, for the embryo has a human
soul infused into the body by God. Human parents are partners with
God in creation. They have very great powers and great responsibilities,
for through their cooperation with God souls are born for heaven.
JOHN MARTIN SCOTT, ADVENTURES IN SCIENCE 618-19 (1963)
180. See Hunt v. McNair, 187 S.E.2d 645, 647 (S.C. 1972).
181. Roemer, 426 U.S. at 763 ("We agree with the District Court that
'excessive entanglement' does not necessarily result from the fact that the
subsidy is an annual one.").
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seem to believe it important that the funds at issue here
went directly to the institution. The Roemer Court noted
that the funds could be used for any non-sectarian purpose,
although the Court was particularly unhelpful with respect
to what uses would be impermissible.18 2 Indeed, rather than
give criteria to determine what would count as sectarian,
the Roemer Court instead deferred to the Council to develop
the appropriate safeguards, apparently endorsing some of
the requirements imposed by the Council.18 3 For example,
the Council precluded the use of state funds "to pay in
whole or in part the salary of any person who is engaged in
the teaching of religion or theology, who serves as chaplain
or director of the campus ministry, or who administers or
supervises any program of religious activities."18 4 Yet, this
does not seem to preclude paying individuals who start
their classes with a prayer, as long as they do not, in
addition, teach religion or theology.
Another provision was that state funds could "not be
used to pay any portion of the cost of maintenance or repair
of any building or facility used for the teaching of religion or
theology or for religious worship or for any religious
activity."18 5 Yet, it was not clear whether this limitation
only referred to those buildings that were primarily used for
religious worship such as a building housing a chapel, or
any building in which religious worship might take place.
One infers that this limitation only meant the former, given
that at one institution over half of the classes began with a
prayer and thus on the latter interpretation many of the
buildings containing classrooms would then be off-limits for
state maintenance support. The same point might be made
about state support for the payment of utilities18 6 or capital
182. See id. at 760 ("We have no occasion to elaborate further on what is and
is not a 'specifically religious activity,' for no particular use of the state funds is
set out in this statute.").
183. Id.
184. Id. at 761 n.22.
185. Id.
186. The Court explained:
If an institution has any building or facility that is used in whole or in
part for the teaching of religion or theology or for religious worship or
for any religious activity, State funds may not be used to pay utilities
bills unless those buildings or facilities are separately metered. If
buildings or facilities used for any religious purpose described in the
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construction or improvements.18 7
Roemer is extremely deferential with respect to what
religiously affiliated institutions of higher learning can do
without offending the establishment clause. 88 The Court
seemed to accept almost wholesale the district court's
conclusion that the "religious programs at each school are
separable from the secular programs,"'1 9 notwithstanding
that many classes began with a prayer.
The district court reasoned that "prayer in class is as
peripheral to the subject of religious permeation of an
institution as are the facts that some instructors wear
clerical garb and some classrooms have religious
symbols."' 90  Perhaps that is so with respect to the
institution. For example, the practices in a particular
classroom might not carry over to classes in a different
building, especially if the students in the latter classes had
no classes in which there were prayers or religious symbols
on the walls or instructors in religious garb. Yet, to say that
these practices would not be enough to establish
institutional permeation hardly suggests that these
practices would not contribute to or even constitute
religious permeation in the very classes in which these
preceding sentence are separately metered, the cost of providing heat,
electricity, and water to those buildings or facilities cannot be paid
with State funds.
Id.
187. See id. ("If State funds are used to construct a new building or facility
or to renovate an existing one, the building or facility may not be used for the
teaching of religion or theology or for religious worship or for any religious
activity at any time in the future.").
188. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Access to Tax Exempt Bonds by Religious
Higher Education Institutions, 65 ED. L. REP. 289, 293 (1991), explaining that:
In Roemer, the Court refused to find that grants given to a group of
church-related schools constituted support for religion, even though the
funds were granted annually and could be put to a wide range of uses,
and even though the schools had church representatives on their
governing boards, employed Roman Catholic chaplains, held Roman
Catholic religious exercises, required students to take religion or
theology classes taught primarily by Roman Catholic priests, made
hiring decisions for faculty in theology positions partly on the basis of
religious considerations, and began some classes with prayer.
189. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282, 1290 (D. Md. 1974),
affld, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
190. Id. at 1293.
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practices were occurring. Certainly, in a classroom with
religious symbols on the walls, it would be unsurprising
that the dynamic of the class would be affected as a general
matter if the instructor, dressed in religious garb, were to
begin the class with a prayer. Further, it would also be
unsurprising were there a kind of carryover effect so that
classes in which these practices did not occur might
nonetheless be affected if many of the students in those
classes were also taking classes in which these religious
practices frequently occurred.
The district court had noted that there was "convincing
evidence that courses at each defendant are taught
'according to the academic requirements intrinsic to the
subject matter and the individual teacher's concept of
professional standards."' 191 Yet, given the qualifier involving
the individual's concept of professional standards, it might
well be that some individual instructors felt that they
would be failing to live up to their responsibilities were they
not to include within their classes the appropriate religious
perspective. While the district court might have been
correct that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that a
professor's "beginning a class with prayer in any way
diminishes the atmosphere of intellectual freedom which
marks these colleges ' 192 as a whole, it is hard to believe that
the same could be said about many of those classes in
particular. Presumably, at least one of the purposes or
foreseeable effects of starting a class with a prayer is to
change that class's atmosphere in a way that the professor
believes would be desirable.
At issue is not whether infusing classes with religion
should be permissible in a religiously affiliated school but,
instead, whether the state would be violating the
establishment clause, for example, by effectively paying the
instructor's salary. Judge Bryan noted in his district court
dissent that the "payment of the grants directly to the
colleges [is] unmarked in purpose." 193 He worried that
grants could "go into secular and sectarian areas at the
same time."194 This danger existed not only with respect to
191. Id. at 1294 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681 (1971)).
192. Id. at 1293.
193. Id. at 1298 (Bryan, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 1299.
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theology departments-until the Council had changed its
regulations195-but also with respect to classes where an
individual instructor's professional judgment required that
she infuse her class with religious instruction.
Some of the institutions whose practices were at issue
in Roemer-College of Notre Dame, Mount Saint Mary's
College, Saint Joseph College and Loyola College, 196 had
been subject to a similar suit earlier. Horace Mann League
v. Board of Public Works 197 involved a challenge to state
funding of Western Maryland College, 198 Notre Dame
College, 199 and St. Joseph College, 200 each of whom was
found by the Maryland Supreme Court to be sufficiently
sectarian that it could not receive state funding. 201 While it
is not surprising that courts over time might reach different
conclusions about whether particular institutions were
sufficiently sectarian to be precluded from receiving funds,
for example, because the jurisprudence or the institutions'
practices had evolved in the interim,202 it is somewhat
surprising that institutions that had been thought so
sectarian that they could not receive aid were subsequently
thought sufficiently unlikely to infuse religious doctrine
into their secular classes that close surveillance would not
be necessary, 203 even when such classes started with a
prayer by an instructor dressed in religious garb.20 4
The trilogy of aid-to-religious-higher-education cases
makes a mockery of establishment clause jurisprudence.
Factors that had been thought to be relevant, for example,
whether teachers were in fact incorporating religious teaching
195. See id. (noting that "the funds could be devoted to the compensation of
theology faculty").
196. Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 744 (1976). Initially,
Western Maryland College was also included, but the suit against that college
was dismissed after the district court's ruling. See id.
197. 220 A.2d 51 (Md. 1966).
198. Id. at 53, 68.
199. Id. at 53, 70.
200. Id. at 53, 71.
201. Id. at 69, 73.
202. Horace Mann was decided in 1966 and Roemer was decided in 1976.
203. See Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 762 (1976).
204. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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into the curriculum, would suddenly not be relevant,
allegedly because the students were less vulnerable to
indoctrination. Indicia that an institution was pervasively
sectarian-for example, whether the school included
religious symbols in the classroom or whether classes began
with prayers-were suddenly less important or, perhaps,
irrelevant as long as these religious practices were not a
result of institutional command. Basically, the Court has
created a jurisprudence where it may well be impossible to
successfully challenge state aid to higher education on
establishment clause grounds. 205
II. APPLICATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE
BY LOWER COURTS
Unsurprisingly, the lower courts have had some difficulty
in applying the relevant jurisprudence consistently. They
have not known which factors would establish that an
institution was pervasively sectarian or even whether such
a designation would preclude an institution from receiving
state funding. Courts have also been unsure whether their
analysis should change if, for example, the state is "merely"
involved because it has created a system whereby the school
reaps a benefit through the issuance of tax-exempt bonds.
The Supreme Court's utter lack of clarity on these issues is
regrettable both because it will likely result in relevantly
similar cases being treated differently and because it may
well mean that establishment clause guarantees will be
diluted even further, both in the higher education context in
particular and in the context of education more generally.
A. The Fourth Circuit
Over the past twenty years, there have been several
cases involving aid to religiously affiliated schools that have
been decided by the state and federal courts in the Fourth
205. See Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., Tales of Two Cities: Canon Law and
Constitutional Law at the Crossroads, 25 J.C. & U.L. 801, 810 (1999) ("No
successful challenge has yet been mounted under the Establishment provision
to any form of financial assistance, federal or state, institutional or student-
based, as long as the level of education was at a religious university."); see also
id. at 816 (stating that the Court's jurisprudence does "not add up to anything
like an economic disincentive or penalty (denial of student aid) for forging a
clearer relationship between Catholics [sic] universities and the Church").
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Circuit. Those cases help illustrate both how confusing the
jurisprudence in this area is and how weak the relevant
protections have now been interpreted to be.
In Habel v. Industrial Developmental Authority, the
Virginia Supreme Court addressed whether Lynchburg's
issuing up to sixty million dollars worth of Educational
Facility Revenue Bonds on behalf of Liberty University
violated constitutional guarantees. 20 6 When seeking to
determine whether the city's doing so would comport with
the establishment clause, the court examined the nature of
the university. The court noted:
Liberty is a church-related, accredited, nonprofit, private university.
In October 1989, its faculty and student handbooks contained a
number of statements setting forth what Liberty required of its
faculty and students. Among the requirements were adherence to
a detailed and specific religious doctrine and compulsory
attendance at six weekly religious services. 20 7
Members of the faculty were subject to further
requirements-for example, they "were obligated to conform
to Liberty's doctrinal statements in teaching their courses
and in publishing articles in their respective academic
fields. '208 There had been testimony that some of the
requirements were not enforced by the school. 209 However,
rather than follow the Tilton Court's lead by concluding
that the absence of enforcement vitiated the constitutional
import of the existence of such policies, the Virginia court
instead suggested that the evidence of non-enforcement had
little or no import, given that the non-enforcement was not
itself publicized. 210  Thus, individuals might still feel
compelled to comply with the announced rules, because
they did not know that these rules would not be enforced. 211
206. Habel v. Indus. Dev. Auth., 400 S.E.2d 516, 517 (Va. 1991).
207. Id. at 518.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 519 (mentioning the "testimony of witnesses that some of
these policies were not enforced before October 1989").
210. Id. ("The testimony of witnesses that some of these policies were not
enforced before October 1989 has little value because the instances of
nonenforcement were not publicized to students or faculty.").
211. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting that unenforced
policies might nonetheless have chilling effects).
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The Virginia Supreme Court concluded that religion was so
pervasive at Liberty University that the bond issue would
violate establishment clause guarantees. 212
In Columbia Union College v. Clarke,213 the Fourth
Circuit recognized that "direct state funding of the general
education courses of a 'pervasively sectarian' institution
would violate the establishment clause. '2 14 However, the
court was not confident that the district court had been
correct in finding that Columbia Union College was a
pervasively sectarian institution.215 For example, the
Fourth Circuit examined the district court's noting of the
"mandatory prayer services for resident students."216 While
suggesting that a "reasonable fact finder could find the
college's mandatory prayer policy, requiring attendance at
religious services of the vast majority of its resident
students, reveals that Columbia Union is primarily
interested in religious indoctrination at the expense of
providing a secular education, ' 217  the circuit court
suggested that a reasonable fact finder might nonetheless
find otherwise. Because a reasonable fact finder might
reach either conclusion, the court suggested that the
district court had erred when finding that this factor
militated in favor of a finding that the institution was
pervasively sectarian. 218
The district court had also considered a college bulletin
for the religion department suggesting that Christian
principles should characterize every phase of life in a
Christian college. 219 However, the circuit court reasoned
that absent evidence of how the traditional or liberal arts
courses were taught, "an equally plausible inference is that
212. See Habel, 400 S.E.2d at 519.
213. 159 F.3d 151 (4th Cir. 1998).
214. Id. at 162-63.
215. See id. at 169 ("We remand the case to the district court so that it can
have an opportunity to make the requisite full and careful determinations
necessary here.")
216. Id. at 164.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 165 ("Where both reasonable inferences coexist, on the State's
motion for summary judgment a court must credit the inference most favorable
to Columbia Union.").
219. Id.
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the college predominantly exposes its students to a wide
variety of academic disciplines, including religious
teachings.' '220 Because a school's exposing its students to a
wide array of subjects and approaches could hardly be used
to establish that the institution was pervasively sectarian,
the district court was wrong to infer that the institution
was pervasively sectarian on this basis.
The college faculty handbook noted that those teaching
had a 'peculiar obligation as Christian scholars,"'221 and
that the faculty had 'complete freedom so long as their
speech and actions are in harmony with the philosophies
and principles of the college.' 222 However, unlike the
district court, the circuit court interpreted these policies as
potentially consistent with the 1940 Statement of Principles
on Academic Freedom, stating that these statements
"provide no proof that the college's religious mission
impinged too greatly on its academic freedom."223 Indeed,
the Fourth Circuit expressly pointed to the Supreme Court
in Tilton and Roemer having cited adherence to the 1940
Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom as "evidence
demonstrating that a college permits 'intellectual freedom'
despite its religious affiliation. ' 224
Thirty-six of the forty full-time faculty members at the
school were Seventh Day Adventists. 225 However, the circuit
court noted, only fifty-seven percent of the Faculty were
Adventists when part-time instructors were included in the
count. 226 Further, while the college's literature itself stated
that the college reserved the right to favor members of the
church in hiring decisions, the circuit court was not
convinced that the college had exercised that right.227
Finally, that the college had asked its students "to evaluate
their professors based in part on whether a professor
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting Columbia Union College's faculty handbook).
222. Id. (quoting Columbia Union College's faculty handbook).
223. Id.
224. See id. (citing Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 756 (1976);
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 681-82 (1971)).
225. Id. at 166. Columbia Union College is affiliated with the Seventh Day
Adventist Church. See id. at 154.
226. Id. at 166.
227. Id.
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stresses Christian values and philosophy in the classroom"
did not convince the circuit court that the college was
pervasively sectarian. 228 Nor did the fact that a great
majority of the students were affiliated with the Church
suffice to establish the sectarian nature of the college. 229
Because of its rejection that any of these factors established
the pervasively sectarian nature of the college, the circuit
court remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to do further fact-finding. 230
In dissent, Chief Judge Wilkinson noted that "the
agreed-upon facts provided the district court with more
than an adequate basis to reach its decision. '231 He worried
that the court's posture "would require district courts to
leave no stone unturned in establishment clause inquiries
into whether educational institutions are properly considered
pervasively sectarian,"232 and further that a religiously
affiliated institution might have to jettison "many of the
beliefs and practices that it holds most dear" in order to
receive state funding.233
There are different ways in which the Fourth Circuit's
opinion might be understood. Perhaps the court was simply
suggesting that the district court was not justified in
concluding that the college was pervasively sectarian, given
the posture of the case. Thus, it might be thought that if all
of the evidence before the district court was viewed in the
light most favorable to the college, the pervasively sectarian
status of the college could not be established as a matter of
law. 234 Arguably, each of the factors could be viewed in a
way which did not conclusively establish the pervasively
228. Id.
229. Id. at 166-67.
230. Id. at 169 ("We remand the case to the district court so that it can have
an opportunity to make the requisite full and careful determinations necessary
here.").
231. Id. (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting).
232. Id.
233. See id. at 170.
234. See id. at 165 (majority opinion) ("Where both reasonable inferences
coexist, on the State's motion for summary judgment a court must credit the
inference most favorable to Columbia Union."); id. at 166 ("[T]he religious
references are simply not enough, in number or in nature, to compel the
inference that Columbia Union's attempts at religious indoctrination
compromise its academic freedom.").
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sectarian nature of the college and, perhaps, even all of the
factors considered together would not establish the
pervasively sectarian nature of the school when viewed in
the required light.
Yet, the remand by the Fourth Circuit might also be
understood somewhat differently. For example, it might be
thought that the Fourth Circuit was suggesting that the
pervasively sectarian status of the college could not
plausibly be established in light of all of the evidence
adduced by the district court, even if that evidence was not
being viewed in the light most favorable to the college. On
remand, the district court adopted this latter interpretation
of the Fourth Circuit's opinion. 235
On rehearing, the district court noted that the United
States Supreme Court had not yet found any college or
university to be pervasively sectarian.236 The district court
then reexamined its previous conclusion that there was a
mandatory worship policy, this time emphasizing that the
policy only applied to students under the age of twenty-
three who lived in the residence halls and thus that the
policy did not apply to the majority of students.237 The court
decided that "[b]ecause the subject mandatory worship
policy reaches only a minority of students, the Court
concludes that the Commission has not met the burden of
demonstrating that the policy is being implemented at the
expense of secular education. ' 238 Apparently, the court was
not confident that there would be any carry-over from the
mandatory religious services into some of the classes which
the residents took with other students. Nor did the court
believe that the institutional decision to have such a
requirement for the younger students who were living on-
campus might have represented an institutional attempt to
influence those students most subject to influence. The
school might have thought, for example, that members of
this group should be required to attend religious services
235. See Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, No. CIV.A. MJG-96-183, 2000 WL
33792738, at *13 (D. Md. Aug. 17, 2000) ("Columbia Union College is not
pervasively sectarian under the decision in Roemer v. Board of Public Works of
Maryland, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).").
236. See id. at *6.
237. Id. at *6-7.
238. Id.
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both because they were younger and because they were
living on-campus and thus their environment was more
subject to institutional control. Certainly, had this cost-
benefit analysis been undertaken by the college, that should
not have been thought to undercut the religious mission of
the school.
The district court considered that successful completion
of religion classes was required by the school in order to
graduate. However, the Fourth Circuit panel had suggested
that it could not tell how those classes were in fact
conducted, notwithstanding the Religion Department's
statement that 'Christian principles should characterize
every phase of college life.' ' 239 This made the actual content
and instructional method involved in the courses of great
constitutional import. But the classes had not been
monitored, because the college had objected that viewing
them would be too intrusive.240
The decision not to monitor the classes was viewed by
the district court as commendable, 241 even though this
meant that there was insufficient evidence to establish that
the religion classes were 'taught with the primary objective
of religious indoctrination. '"' 242 But the inability to establish
that about the religion classes meant that the fact that
religion classes were mandatory could not be used to help
establish the pervasively sectarian nature of the institution.
The court implicitly commended the state for adopting a
"hear no evil, see no evil, say no evil" attitude, which
permitted a possibly pervasively sectarian institution to
escape that designation and receive state funding.243
Testimony had been offered to establish that the college
239. Id. (quoting a 1996-97 bulletin from Columbia Union College's Religion
Department).
240. Id. at *7 n.15.
241. Id.
242. Id. (quoting Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 169, 176
(4th Cir. 1998) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting)).
243. Cf. Carolyn A. Kubitschek, Holding Foster Care Agencies Responsible
for Abuse and Neglect, 32 HuM. RTS. 6, 6 (2005) (discussing difficulties which
arise when officials who are responsible for overseeing foster placements adopt
an approach of "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil, and write no evil in the
case file").
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did not foster academic freedom. 244 However, the court
noted that "faculty members 'have complete freedom so long
as their speech and actions are in harmony with the
philosophies and principles of the college,' '' 245 and concluded
that the academic freedom was sufficient for purposes of the
inquiry in question.246 Yet, to say that the faculty members
have complete freedom to speak and write as long as they
follow the party line is to do violence to the notion of
academic freedom. That said, however, it is not at all clear
that the district court rather than the United States
Supreme Court deserves to be criticized for offering this
"Alice in Wonderland" analysis of academic freedom. 247
While recognizing that the college employed religious
preferences in hiring248 and recruiting students,249 the
district court did not believe that enough of the criteria had
been met to establish the pervasively sectarian nature of
the college. The court held instead that the college had a
"definite and strong, secondary, goal to teach with a
'Christian vision,'250 apparently believing that an
institution with such a goal would not be likely to infuse
even its Religion courses with religious instruction.
This decision was appealed. The Fourth Circuit held
that the college was entitled to receive funds "without
resort to examining the college's pervasively sectarian
status,"251 suggesting that even pervasively sectarian
institutions were not constitutionally barred from receiving
state funds.
244. Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, No. CIV.A. MJG-96-183, 2000 WL
33792738, at *8 (D. Md. Aug. 17, 2000).
245. Id. at *8 (quoting Columbia Union College's Policy Handbook for
Administration and Faculty).
246. See id. at *9 ("In the instant context, there is not a denial of academic
freedom determinatively characteristic of a pervasively sectarian institution
because a college requires its faculty to follow the religious mission of the
school.").
247. Cf. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 928-29 (1996)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("Such a result has an Alice in Wonderland aspect
to it, which suggests the distinction upon which it is based is a fallacious one.").
248. Oliver, 2000 WL 33792738 at *11.
249. Id. at *12.
250. Id. at*13.
251. Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 254 F.3d 496, 504 (4th Cir. 2001).
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Perhaps as a way of shielding the opinion from further
review, the circuit court also noted with approval the
district court's finding that the college was not pervasively
sectarian. 25 2 The circuit court compared the practices of
Columbia Union College with those of the colleges at issue
in Tilton, Hunt, and Roemer, and found that the college's
practices did not differ in a constitutionally significant way
from the practices that had been upheld.253
The Fourth Circuit's constitutional analysis was rather
surprising. The court decided whether pervasively sectarian
institutions could receive state funding, notwithstanding
that (1) the issue was not before the court, (2) the United
States Supreme Court has not (yet)254  rejected the
relevance of a school's being pervasively sectarian,255 and
(3) the result in Columbia Union College v. Oliver would
have been the same whether or not the Constitution
permitted pervasively sectarian universities to be treated
differently. 256 The opinion was all the more surprising
because (1) before the Fourth Circuit had remanded this
very case for further consideration, it had noted that direct
state funding of courses at pervasively sectarian
institutions violates federal constitutional guarantees;257
and (2) the prior decision by the Fourth Circuit involving
this very case had been appealed, and the United States
Supreme Court had denied certiorari rather than take the
opportunity to overrule the pervasively sectarian
jurisprudence. 258 While the refusal to grant certiorari is not
252. Id. at 508.
253. Id. at 509.
254. See Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 527 U.S. 1013 (1999) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of writ of certiorari) ("We should take this opportunity to
scrap the 'pervasively sectarian' test .... ").
255. See Oliver, 254 F.3d at 510 (Motz, J., concurring) ("[U]nless and until
the Supreme Court overrules Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md. . . . I am
unwilling to join in a holding finding that the pervasively sectarian analysis
adopted there-when interpreting the very statute at issue here-no longer
controls") (parallel citations omitted).
256. See id. at 510-11 (Motz, J., concurring) ("Such a holding seems
particularly unwarranted when application of the pervasively sectarian
analysis requires the same result as the (perhaps) premature disavowal of it.").
257. See Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 162-63 (4th Cir.
1998).
258. Cf. Clarke, 527 U.S. at 1013 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of writ
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equivalent to the Court's affirming the jurisprudence, 259
such a refusal provides no basis for believing that the
jurisprudence has changed in a significant way.
In Virginia College Building Authority v. Lynn, the
Virginia Supreme Court recognized that Regent University
is "pervasively sectarian," but nonetheless held that the
state could issue revenue bonds for the benefit of that
university except insofar as those bonds would have
benefited the Divinity School. 260 Basically, the Virginia
Supreme Court followed the line of reasoning suggested by
the South Carolina Supreme Court in Hunt261-because the
funds were from private investors rather than state coffers,
the funding could not be attributed to the state and thus
was not an endorsement of religion. 262
The Lynn court noted how similar the case before it was
to the facts of Hunt,263 although the school in Hunt, unlike
Regent, had not been found to be pervasively sectarian. 264
The Lynn court seemed to rely heavily on a footnote in Hunt
in which the court had explained that because the aid at
issue would not advance or inhibit religion, the court would
not address whether the revenue financing at issue in Hunt
would pass muster even had the school been pervasively
sectarian. 265 Yet, the court's having refused to address an
issue relied on by the court below and instead having
offered a different analysis cannot plausibly be cited as an
endorsement of the position the court quite consciously
refused to analyze.
of certiorari) ("We should take this opportunity to scrap the 'pervasively
sectarian' test ....").
259. See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 525
U.S. 943, 943 (1998) (Stevens, J., opinion regarding the denial of the petition for
a writ of certiorari) ("[T]he denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari is not a
ruling on the merits.").
260. Virginia Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 689 (Va. 2000).
261. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
262. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 699.
263. Id. at 695 (describing Hunt as "a case remarkably similar to the case
before us").
264. The Lynn court noted regarding Hunt: "Upon review of the sparse
record in that case, the Court observed that there was 'no basis to conclude that
the College's operations are oriented significantly towards sectarian rather than
secular education."' Id. at 695 (citing Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 744 (1973)).
265. See id. at 695-96.
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The Virginia Supreme Court noted that the
"Establishment clause landscape is ever-changing. '266
While that may be true, the court was relying on a footnote
in a case decided eighteen years prior to Habel, the decision
in which the Virginia court had denied Liberty University
the funding on both state and federal constitutional
grounds. 267 Further, the Virginia court seemed to pay too
little attention to its own holding in Habel that the state
constitution barred the funding at issue. Even were the
United States Supreme Court to hold that the
establishment clause does not bar state funding of
pervasively sectarian institutions, which thus far it has not,
a separate question is whether a state constitution could
bar such funding. Locke v. Davey, a decision issued
subsequent to Lynn, suggests that such a state
constitutional bar may not offend federal constitutional
guarantees.268
The establishment clause jurisprudence with respect to
the funding of religiously affiliated institutions of higher
learning has undergone a shift in the Fourth Circuit. Both
state and federal courts have become more willing to say
that that state funding of pervasively sectarian institutions
does not violate establishment clause guarantees. In Lynn,
the Virginia Supreme Court emphasized the special nature
of the funding at issue, although in Columbia Union College
v. Oliver the Fourth Circuit did not rely on that basis to
conclude that pervasively sectarian institutions of higher
learning must also be eligible for state funding. The Fourth
Circuit is not alone in suggesting that the aid-to-higher-
education jurisprudence now permits pervasively sectarian
institutions to benefit from state largesse.
266. Id. at 691.
267. See Habel v. Indus. Dev. Auth., 400 S.E.2d 516, 519 (Va. 1991) ("[T]he
proposed bond issue would violate the Establishment of Religion Clauses of the
United States and Virginia Constitutions.").
268. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that a state
constitutional provision prohibiting state support of the pursuit of a devotional
degree was constitutional). The Locke Court suggested that "The State's
interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the
exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars.
If any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here." Id. at
725.
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B. The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit has also been forced to address the
conditions under which the state can provide funding for
pervasively sectarian institutions. That circuit has also
suggested that the Constitution does not preclude the state
from helping pervasively sectarian institutions pursue their
religious goals.
In Steele v. Industrial Development Board of
Metropolitan Government Nashville,269 the Sixth Circuit
offered an analysis which echoed the Virginia Supreme
Court's Lynn analysis. At issue was whether David Lipscomb
University, a "pervasively sectarian institution,"270 was
entitled to benefit from the issuance of tax-exempt bonds. 271
While noting that "[t]he vitality of the pervasively sectarian
test [was] questionable," 272 the Sixth Circuit reasoned that
it did not have to decide whether pervasively sectarian
institutions can receive state funding as a general matter.
Rather, the circuit court held that because the state was
merely acting as a "conduit, '273 the issuance of the bonds
comported with First Amendment guarantees. 274
Judge Clay noted in his Steele dissent:
That no governmental funds actually reach the coffers of the
pervasively sectarian educational institution does not alter for one
moment the fact that a direct economic benefit accrues to such an
institution as a result of the government's active participation in
arranging for a low-cost loan that enables the institution to
advance its sectarian mission. 27 5
Judge Clay reasoned that the fact that an institution was
receiving a direct economic benefit would suffice to
establish that the program should be examined in light of
269. 301 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2002).
270. Id. at 408.
271. Id. at 402.
272. Id. at 408; see also Collier, supra note 151, at 1121 ("There is a growing
sense among observers of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence that
the Tilton trilogy's pervasively sectarian analysis may be obsolete.").
273. Steele, 301 F.3d at 414.
274. See id. at 416.
275, Id. at 438 (Clay, J., dissenting).
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establishment clause limitations, which would (presumably)
mean that a pervasively sectarian institution would not be
permitted to receive the funding.276 While Judge Clay's
view seems to represent the view thus far articulated by the
Court, both the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have suggested
that it is constitutionally permissible for the state to help a
pervasively sectarian institution provide instruction. That
is exactly what the Court implied the establishment clause
precludes when the Court emphasized the importance of
requiring that state funds only be used for secular
education.277
Suppose that the current Supreme Court were to
endorse the results in Steele and Lynn. It would presumably
only be a matter of time before the special nature of the
funding in those cases would be viewed as not particularly
special, 278 and direct funding of pervasively sectarian
institutions would be viewed as required in certain
circumstances. Justice Thomas has already suggested that
pervasively sectarian institutions should be eligible for
state funding, claiming that "the Constitution requires, at a
minimum, neutrality not hostility toward religion,"279 and
that the refusal to fund pervasively sectarian institutions
manifests hostility towards religion. It is simply unclear
how many members of the Court agree with Justice Thomas
on this matter.28 0
There is yet another way in which the establishment
clause jurisprudence on aid to sectarian institutions seems
open to slippage. The Court has suggested that the
establishment clause may impose fewer restraints on the
funding of colleges and universities if only because the
increased skepticism of the students makes religious
276. But see supra notes 263-67 and accompanying text.
277. Cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679-80 (1979) ("[The Higher
Education Facilities Act] authorizes grants and loans only for academic
facilities that will be used for defined secular purposes and expressly prohibits
their use for religious instruction, training, or worship.").
278. See Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682, 698 (Va. 2000)
(discussing the "unique nature of the governmental aid").
279. See Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 527 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
280. While no one else signed onto Justice Thomas's dissent to the denial of
a writ of certiorari in Columbia Union College v. Clarke, that may have been for
reasons unrelated to the substance of his dissent.
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indoctrination more difficult.281 However, the Sixth Circuit
has applied its view that the establishment clause offers
rather weak limitations on public funding of sectarian
institutions in a context involving primary and secondary
schools rather than colleges and universities. Thus, in
Johnson v. Economic Development Corporation, the Sixth
Circuit examined a program whereby tax-exempt bonds
would be used to help finance the construction of buildings
at the Academy of the Sacred Heart, a Catholic elementary
and secondary school. 28 2 The school presented itself as a
"Christ-centered institution within the tradition of the
Roman Catholic Church,"28 3 although the Sixth Circuit held
that the institution was not pervasively sectarian,28 4 at
least in part, because the faculty and student body included
non-Christian members. 28 5
That the institution was not held to be pervasively
sectarian did not end the matter, because even institutions
that are not pervasively sectarian are prohibited from using
state funds for religious projects. The circuit court was
convinced that the funds would not be used inappropriately
"because the Project expressly excluded the school's
chapel."28 6 However, the analysis involving whether the
funds would be used to promote religious instruction was
less rigorous than might have been desired.
The Johnson court was convinced that public funds
would not be used to promote religious instruction because
a "review of the course descriptions and the subjects
covered for each of the courses . ..demonstrates that the
Academy does not interject religion into every aspect of its
curriculum."28 7  Yet, a mere review of the course
descriptions would likely not reveal how the school's Christ-
centered approach was being implemented. Perhaps the
school did not incorporate religious instruction within its
classes, but the circuit court's cursory examination of some
281. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686.
282. Johnson v. Econ. Dev. Corp., 241 F.3d 501, 503 (6th Cir. 2001).
283. Id. at 504.
284. Id. at 516.
285. Id. at 517.
286. Id. at 516.
287. Id. at 517.
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of the relevant materials would hardly establish that,
especially given the school's self-presentation as a Christ-
centered institution.
The Johnson court repeatedly referred to Roemer and
Hunt,28 8 suggesting at one point that Hunt bore a "striking
resemblance to the case at bar. ' 28 9 But the court nowhere
mentioned that Hunt and Roemer involved institutions of
higher learning and that the Court has suggested that it is
significant for establishment clause purposes if the students
are in college rather than in elementary or secondary
school.
It may be that the Academy of the Sacred Heart is not
pervasively sectarian and does not engage in religious
instruction in state-funded classrooms. Further, it may be
that the current Court would no longer hold that there is an
important difference between providing funding for primary
or secondary religiously affiliated institutions and providing
funding for religiously affiliated institutions of higher
learning. But the Court has not yet repudiated the
distinction and has not held that systems involving tax-
exempt bonds need not be examined to make sure that they
do not promote religious instruction. The Johnson court did
not seem to appreciate the importance of the above points,
although the court may ultimately have captured the view
of the current Court on aid to sectarian institutions.
CONCLUSION
The trilogy of cases involving aid to higher education
can be read in various ways. Perhaps the Court was
wrestling with a very difficult problem-how to draw a line
that does not involve the state's promoting religious
indoctrination but at the same time permits religiously
affiliated institutions to benefit from state funding. Perhaps
the Court was confident that some religiously affiliated
colleges and universities should be eligible for state funding
because they clearly do not engage in religious instruction
but the Court had difficulty in formulating a standard that
would distinguish those religiously affiliated institutions
that were eligible for funding from those that were not.
288. Id. at 515-16.
289. Id. at 516.
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Yet, it may be that the Court was not trying to wrestle
with the best way to articulate the relevant standard.
Perhaps, instead, the Court was merely paying lip service
to the notion that the state should not support religious
instruction. It is rather difficult to tell, especially given the
Court's seeming reliance on the Statement of Principles on
Academic Freedom, which itself permits institutions to impose
limitations on their faculty as long as the institution's
written policies make the institutional expectations clear.
Recently, some courts have upheld the permissibility of
providing the benefits from tax-free bonds to pervasively
sectarian institutions, reasoning that this type of financing
does not violate establishment clause guarantees. It is a
mark of the inscrutability if not incoherence of the Court's
trilogy of aid-to-higher-education cases that it is simply
unclear whether this is a marked departure from the past
jurisprudence or, instead, an application of it.290
The Court has never addressed whether revenue bonds
are so different from other kinds of financing that what
would otherwise be constitutionally impermissible does not
offend constitutional guarantees as long as revenue bond
financing is used.291 However, both the Hunt and the
290. Both the Lynn and Steele courts cited Hunt's refusal to examine
whether revenue bonds should be treated differently. Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd.,
301 F.3d 401, 409 (6th Cir. 2002); Va. Coll. Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 538 S.E.2d 682,
695-96 (Va. 2000). These courts seemed to infer that Hunt permitted
pervasively sectarian institutions to receive this kind of financing, although
recognizing that the Hunt Court never expressly stated that. See Steele, 301
F.3d at 409, stating:
This passage would seem to indicate that a public body could serve as a
conduit to allow a pervasively sectarian institution to receive the
benefits of tax free bonds so long as public funds were not expended.
Rather than reach such conclusion, however, the Supreme Court
instead found that the schools at issue were not, in fact, pervasively
sectarian and found it unnecessary to address the precise issue before
this Court.
See also Lynn, 538 S.E.2d at 695 ("In footnote seven, the Court suggested that
even if an institution is pervasively sectarian, the aid in question may be so
unique that the provision of the aid does not result in 'the primary effect' of
advancing or inhibiting religion.").
291. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 745 n.7 (1973), where the Court
stated that:
The "state aid" involved in this case is of a very special sort. We have
here no expenditure of public funds, either by grant or loan, no
reimbursement by a State for expenditures made by a parochial school
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Roemer Courts spent a lot of time analyzing which
institutions were pervasively sectarian. It is at the very
least surprising that the Court would have done all of this
analysis if the cases could have been disposed of easily by
noting that the method of financing did not involve the
state's contributing public dollars to promote religious
instruction and thus establishment clause guarantees
either were not implicated or were only implicated in an
attenuated way.
Yet, focusing on where the Court directs its attention
may not be the most felicitous way to further one's
understanding of establishment clause guarantees. As the
Fourth Circuit noted in Columbia Union College v. Oliver,
the Supreme Court has never found a college to be
pervasively sectarian. 292 Perhaps that is because of the
particular colleges that happened to come before the Court.
However, some of the colleges at issue in Roemer had
previously been found by the Maryland Supreme Court to
be so sectarian that they could not receive funding, and
there was no suggestion in Roemer that the schools'
practices had changed in the intervening years.
Some courts seem to imply that the Court's never
having characterized a school as pervasively sectarian
should be understood to mean that this set of institutions
or college, and no extending or committing of a State's credit. Rather,
the only state aid consists, not of financial assistance directly or
indirectly which would implicate public funds or credit, but the
creation of an instrumentality (the Authority) through which
educational institutions may borrow funds on the basis of their own
credit and the security of their own property upon more favorable
interest terms than otherwise would be available. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey characterized the assistance rendered an educational
institution under an act generally similar to the South Carolina Act as
merely being a "governmental service." . . . The South Carolina
Supreme Court, in the opinion below, described the role of the State as
that of a "mere conduit." . . . Because we conclude that the primary
effect of the assistance afforded here is neither to advance nor to
inhibit religion under Lemon and Tilton, we need not decide whether,
as appellees argue, Brief for Appellees 14, the importance of the tax
exemption in the South Carolina scheme brings the present case under
Walz v. Tax Comm'n . . . where this Court upheld a local property tax
exemption which included religious institutions.
Id. (quoting Clayton v. Kervick, 56 N.J. 523, 530-31 (1970); Hunt v. McNair, 258
S.C. 97, 107 (1972); citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
292. See Columbia Union Coll. v. Oliver, 254 F.3d 496, 509 (4th Cir. 2001).
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trumpeted by the Court as precluded from receiving state
funding should be understood to be empty. If that has been
the Court's view sub silentio, then Justice Thomas's claim
that pervasively sectarian institutions should be eligible for
state funding does not really represent a shift in view about
who is eligible but merely a shift in view on whether the
Court should be honest when representing its view of
establishment clause guarantees.
Perhaps the Court has been trying to draw a bright line
between funding religiously affiliated institutions of higher
learning on the one hand and religiously affiliated primary
and secondary schools on the other. However, were that the
goal, the Court would have been much more helpful had it
been honest and announced that rule instead of forcing
courts to divine its meaning. Now, courts are not only
upholding aid even to pervasively sectarian institutions of
higher learning but are also upholding aid to sectarian
primary and secondary schools, even without doing the kind
of analysis that the Court has suggested must be
performed.
Establishment clause jurisprudence is difficult to
understand and apply under any circumstances. But the
Court has made it all the harder by implying that certain
factors are important and then ignoring them. One can only
hope that the Court will offer an account of the
establishment clause that not only is clear but that does not
further weaken the protections the clause offers, although it
seems unlikely that any such account will be offered in the
foreseeable future.
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